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Both William Shakespeare’s tragedy Titus Andronicus and J. M. Coetzee’s postcolonial 
novel Disgrace follow the stories of fathers struggling with their own dishonor and “disgrace” as 
well as that of their daughters, both of whom survive sexual violence. Berit Åström’s argument 
for the historical and social transcendence of “referred pain”—“when the sexual suffering of 
women is featured, the narrative focus is on the emotions of fathers, husbands and lovers; the 
pain suffered by the female body is referred to the male mind”—explains how the expression of 
women’s pain in both texts is eclipsed by the pain of their fathers (125). While both Titus 
Andronicus and David Lurie love their daughters and are willing to put themselves at risk in 
order to protect them, the precarious natures of honor and grace make navigating the challenges 
presented by such physical and emotional terrain nearly impossible for both men. For them, 
honor and grace seem to come not from meaningful, concrete relationships with others but from 
abstract and isolating ideals that will hopefully “lead [one] to a higher life” (Coetzee 74). As a 
Roman warrior and a post-apartheid South African academic, the stakes for earning that honor or 
grace are certainly not even remotely equivalent for Titus or David; however, when each of their 
daughters is physically and emotionally traumatized by a brutal gang rape, the stakes of 
fatherhood certainly are. This work will not, by any means, pretend to compare Lavinia and 
Lucy’s traumas; instead, it compares the ways in which their fathers create—or fail to create—a 
safe space for them to contend with that trauma and move forward “in response to a wrong,” one 
that must be answered even “when the gods are silent and the state too weak or corrupt to bring 
about just solutions” (Willis 23). While it is true that both Titus Andronicus and David Lurie are 
incredibly cold and cruel men, Titus’s obsession with his honor eclipses Lavinia’s agency 
whereas David’s eventual (albeit reluctant) acceptance of Lucy’s choices, no matter how 
troublesome they seem to him, ultimately creates conditions of possibility. Coetzee represents 
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Lurie as ultimately shedding the patriarchal preoccupation with “dignity” and “honor” that 
precludes various alternate possibilities for living and, instead, relies too heavily on death and 
destruction for its maintenance. 
 The familial conditions of what renaissance scholars define as the early modern period 
set up an economy in which the daughter was just a commodity, a reflection of her father’s 
honor, and a way of expanding the family’s honor. As historians like Elizabeth A. Foyster 
observe, early modern patriarchalism began in the home:  “Political theorists… drew analogies 
between the power of the king in the state and that of the father in the family,” thus designating 
the household the primary site of male supremacy with the father as its head (3). Alexandra 
Shepard adds in her article “From Anxious Patriarchs to Refined Gentlemen?” that the household 
was modeled in such a fashion “because the stability of the commonwealth was deemed to 
depend on its proper ordering” (70). This ordering consequently prescribed “appropriate” gender 
roles using the language of “honor” to ensure its maintenance. For example, in her book 
Meanings of Manhood, Shepard points out that “strength… self-sufficiency, honesty, authority, 
autonomy, self-government… reason, wisdom, and wit were all claimed for patriarchal 
manhood,” which extended into control of his household, and earned a man honor and reputation 
in the wider community (247). Manhood, moreover, was defined in direct opposition to 
womanhood, so the differences between women and men were often exaggerated in order to 
reinforce men’s authority. This diametrical opposition resulted in a significantly restrictive set of 
prescribed behavioral options for women; for example, the commonly held belief that femininity 
was marked by a lack of reason and an uncontrollable passion called for women’s virtue and 
restraint, particularly, their chastity. Because wives and children were subordinate to 
husbands/fathers, this meant that his honor depended on their good behavior and obedience to 
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him. Being a good father/husband, then, involved maintaining the physical and moral well-being 
of the family. Because daughters were destined to one day become wives and mothers 
themselves, however, they were not only a reflection of their father’s honor, but also a way of 
expanding it. Finding a suitable match, therefore, involved finding a husband for one’s daughter 
who would benefit the family politically as well as economically. A marriage, while it may have 
been lovingly arranged, was essentially a transaction of “property” between men.  
Such a system, of course, naturally placed families in competition with one another, just 
as their nations were, and those competitions were not without violence, Shepard notes:  
As a form of regulation and correction, as a demonstration of male strength and  
authority, and as a method of territorial demarcation, violence conferred manhood in  
ways which both bolstered and countered patriarchal codes of order and which also  
served alternative codes of manhood according to the status and context of those  
involved. (16) 
As the most commodifiable member of the family, a daughter’s value made her exceptionally 
vulnerable and therefore at significant risk for violation. The most extreme (although certainly 
not the only) violation of female sexual autonomy, at any point in history, is rape. In an early 
modern context, however, rape was both a private and public crime in that was both physical 
violence toward a woman that often resulted in their—and, consequently, their family’s—social 
destruction. The rape of a chaste woman was viewed first and foremost as a property crime, as a 
theft of a commodity belonging to the husband/father. This theft had larger social implications as 
an “unchaste” woman brought dishonor to her family and also prevented the family from 
marrying her into a wealthier or more reputable family. Conduct books of the time, such as Juan 
Luis Vives’s Instruction of a Christian Woman advised that unless a woman could marry her 
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rapist, she was “cursed” and “not worthy to live” (Vives 104). Not only does Vives provide 
multiple examples of women who lost their chastity and were killed by their families in horrific 
ways, but he also blames the women for their own attacks: “[chastity] which no man will take 
from her against her will, nor touch it, except she be willing herself” (107). To kill a raped 
woman was not considered murder, but justice. Jocelyn Catty reminds us, however, that although 
rape “may function as a crime against other men” in the early modern period, “it is the female 
body that is always the site of contestation” (10), a point that is too often forgotten in 
conversations about the significance of such a violent crime.     
What is in place in early modern England, then, is a culture ripe for erasing the 
daughter’s experience as about anything but her male family members, and a culture which we 
must be wary of ourselves. This is the stage on which William Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus 
takes place. Two arguments dominate the critical conversation surrounding Lavinia in Titus 
Andronicus: primarily, that she is an unfortunate victim of the violent patriarchal system1 and, 
more recently, that she is also an agent in the traditionally masculine theatre of revenge.2 This 
second argument tends to skirt around her murder at the play’s end, yet both arguments ignore 
the intersection at which it is very possible that Lavinia is an active participant in this system 
because she wants to live, which accounts for the unsettling impact of both her survival and her 
death on the audience. My argument will show how Lavinia can both be an active participant in 
 
1 Deborah Willis provides a rather robust list of “feminist assessments” of Lavinia in the first 
footnote of her article “‘The gnawing vulture’: Revenge, Trauma Theory, and Titus Andronicus.” 
To that I would add Lisa S. Starks-Estes’s “Shakespeare’s Perverse Astraea, Martyr’d Philomel, 
and Lamenting Hecuba: Ovid, Sadomasochism, and Trauma in Titus Andronicus.” 
2 For a reading of Lavinia as an agent of revenge, see Marguerite A. Tassi’s “Reporting the 
Women’s Causes Aright: Wounded Names and Revenge Narratives in Hamlet, Titus Andronicus, 
and Much Ado About Nothing.”  
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the revenge plot as well as, ultimately, a victim of it due to her father’s obsession with the crime 
as one against him.   
That her father sees Lavinia merely as a signifier of his own honor is clear from Titus’s 
opening scene, but equally important is the obviousness by which Lavinia plays the part to her 
advantage. When Titus returns from a decade-long campaign to expand Rome’s empire, his 
daughter kneels at his feet and asks his blessing. Although Titus refers to her as “the cordial of 
mine age,” what should be an emotional reunion is overladen with performativity (1.1.169). As 
Mary L. Fawcett notes, Lavinia immediately performs the honor due to her father upon her 
entrance, expressing the wish that he live “in peace and honor” and, more specifically, “in fame” 
(160-161). Next, she uses the interjection “Lo” to draw attention to the “tributary tears” she 
“render[s] for my brethren’s obsequies” (161-162). The terminology she uses to describe her 
grief empties it of emotion, renders it (to use her own language) as purely ceremonial, merely 
“tributary” and “obsequious.” The use of the term “brethren” is, similarly, so vague that it could 
apply to either the literal brothers she has lost, or to any of the Roman soldiers fallen in the last 
ten years. Moreover, the establishment of her tears as largely ceremonial empties the “tears of 
joy” she claims to shed for her father’s return of emotion. Her speech and actions throughout the 
scene, including her consequent kneeling in subjection and request for a blessing by his 
“victorious hand, / Whose fortunes Rome’s best citizens applaud,” then, place added emphasis 
on the necessity of maintaining and even promoting Titus’s honor over her emotional experience 
as a woman abandoned by her family and who has even lost several members of it in a time of 
war (166-167). She is, quite simply, performing exactly as would have been expected of a 
woman of her status at the time. According to conduct texts such as those by Juan Luis Vives, 
“as oft as a maid goeth forth among people, so often she cometh in judgment and extreme peril 
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of her… honesty, demureness, wit, shamefastness, and virtue” (108-109). Lavinia’s speech and 
actions reveal the extent to which she plays the part of an honest and virtuous daughter, carefully 
avoiding language and action that might blot her “estimation” in order to win her father’s favor. 
On the other hand, the evacuation of emotion from the reunion makes obvious how performative 
adhering to such a set of rules is, drawing attention to the mechanics of such an ideology.  
As an exemplary father and soldier, Titus’s response to Lavinia establishes what it means 
to be a father and a daughter at this time: to have raised a daughter who is valuable to him not 
only as a reflection of his honor, but also as an exchangeable commodity between men to form or 
strengthen alliances. First, like Lavinia, he uses the formal “thy.” Second, even when he does 
refer to Lavinia as “the cordial of mine age to glad my heart,” he gives credit not to her, but to 
“Kind Rome” (1.1.168). Furthermore, his blessing on her is for her to “live, outlive thy father’s 
days” and fame “for virtue’s praise” (170-171); in other words, he says that he blesses her not 
because he loves her, but because she is virtuous and therefore further honoring his good name. 
All of this is spoken, moreover, in the presence of the Tribunes as well as in the presence of the 
other men contending for emperor—those who the performance is for. Because Lavinia dutifully 
performs the role of daughter with all of the virtue that would have been expected of her, and 
Titus, therefore, values her, both are prime examples of individuals historian Alexandra Shepard 
would say subscribe to ideals of “patriarchal manhood” (291). If “early modern manhood is… 
closely linked to maintaining domestic order over subordinates,” then Titus’s language maintains 
both his dominance over his daughter as well as his subordination to his nation (Shepard 283). 
Lynda Boose points out how patriarchal manhood, even when strictly adhered to, constantly 
endangers women, particularly daughters, because “the father [is expected to sacrifice] the 
daughter to the perceived demands of the patriarchy and thus [affirm] his membership in it” (40). 
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Because Titus (like many other early modern men) views Lavinia as an extension of himself, she 
is diminished and made into something that he can, if he chooses, ultimately dispose of—even 
kill—if she no longer positively serves him.  
 The degree of Lavinia’s value is made clear by her literal exchange between her father 
and the emperor. After his election, Saturninus thanks Titus for his service in the war by 
choosing Lavinia as his empress “to advance / Thy name and honourable family” (1.1.242-243). 
This exchange not only rewards Titus’s soldiership, but also the state, as a suitable marriage to 
an honest and virtuous noblewoman by the head of state will bring stability and security. As Eve 
Kosofky Sedgwick argues, “through their competition for, their 'traffic in,' a shared female object 
of desire, two male rivals bond 'homosocially,' establishing and ensuring 'the structures for 
maintaining and transmitting patriarchal power" (528). Titus’s immediate offer of more 
“Presents well worthy Rome’s imperious lord,” the spoils of war, to which Saturninus responds 
by addressing Titus hyperbolically as the “father of my life” as opposed to the more literal 
“father of my wife” emphasizes the relationship between the two men over all other relationships 
onstage (254 and 257). Furthermore, it emphasizes how the silent Lavinia already seems to have 
been forgotten and lumped in with the other gifts: his sword, chariot, and prisoners. Lavinia’s 
association with these other “gifts,” which include other people, implies the perception of her not 
as a separate person, but only in relation to himself—as an exchangeable commodity that cannot 
realize the benefits of its own exchange. In “The Traffic of Women: Notes on the ‘Political 
Economy’ of Sex” Gayle Rubin argues that “marriages are a most basic form of gift exchange, in 
which it is women who are the most precious of gifts… because the relationship thus established 
is not just one of reciprocity, but of kinship,” which is linked to power (36). Thus, Saturninus’s 
offer and Titus’s agreement to marry Lavinia is merely a mutual exchange of power between the 
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men that does not account for the desire of (and therefore the subjecthood of) the person they are 
exchanging. The closest the play gets to accounting for their desires is when Saturninus asks 
Lavinia if she is “not displeased with” his promise to treat the Goths well (1.1.274). Although his 
asking of the question does elevate Lavinia above the Goths, his use of a double negative here 
ensures that his question is a closed one with an expected answer, which Lavinia seems to 
dutifully provide: “Not I, my lord” (275). Her response could be confirming Saturninus’s 
benevolence, but it is also possible that she is negating it: she is not not displeased—not 
pleased—with his promise. Although Lavinia’s commodification by her father is by no means 
anomalous, her marriage coupled with Titus’s presentation of the spoils of war links her 
exchange to larger and more literal instances of patriarchal violence. Moreover, her reaction 
reveals that if Lavinia wants to maintain a position of any power whatsoever in such a system, 
she, too, must participate in it and accept the single opportunity for social advancement presented 
to her, thus resisting her social erasure through obedience to social expectations.  
 As Mary L. Fawcett points out, the action-packed remainder of the scene, although it 
revolves entirely around Lavinia, does not allow her to speak for herself: “we cannot tell about 
her intentions, or even whether she has any” (266), perhaps emphasizing the complicity 
necessary for her survival. Thus, Lavinia fully becomes the ideal exchangeable object in the war 
for men’s honor and does not provide any evidence that she is anything otherwise. Bassianus, 
according to the stage directions, “seizes” her and calls her “mine” —not by asking for her 
consent, but for Titus’s (1.1.280). The use of the word “seize,” especially by the stage directions 
as opposed to a character, demonstrates her function as merely a material possession in the action 
of this scene. When Titus does not approve of the match and calls for immediate action, he 
claims that “Lavinia is surprised,” introducing a counternarrative to the one Bassianus provides 
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of their already having been “betrothed” (288 and 290); one must wonder, does the actress 
appear shocked by the events, or is this merely Titus projecting his distaste onto her? The scene’s 
ambiguity continues as Bassianus and her brothers “bear Lavinia out” while Mutius defends their 
exit from an enraged Titus. This could be staged in a multitude of ways depending on the extent 
that Lavinia is shown to be cooperating with or resisting the men. Are they carrying a struggling 
woman offstage, or are they merely escorting her away from the violence that is about to unfold?  
The ambiguity surrounding her desires here is critical as it emphasizes the men’s 
subjecthood over hers, and, furthermore, the choices Titus makes both refuse Lavinia agency and 
ultimately necessitate filicide. Not only is Lavinia not given a choice in her marriage, she is not 
even provided an opportunity to speak on her own behalf when its legitimacy is challenged. She, 
as Carolyn Asp points out, “visually… enacts the fate of a woman in the Symbolic Order: she is 
a pawn in a power struggle between men… seized by the strongest contestant” (337). It is not 
simply that Lavinia’s desires are rejected by the men, but also that there is no indication 
whatsoever of what they might be; she is, as Whitney Sperrazza argues, “a kind of tabula rasa” 
for the men onstage, “a surface on which they can inscribe, read and overwrite their desired 
narratives” (185). Her character’s opacity shifts attention away from questions of marital 
injustice and onto the violence of the men’s ensuing actions. That Titus would go so far as he kill 
a son and disown the others to prevent his “dishonor,” speaks to how enmeshed in the 
“subordination” required by the patriarchal economy of honor he truly is: because he sees his 
children only as extensions of himself, he would willingly sacrifice any of them for Saturninus’s 
favor (1.1.300). As the war with the Goths before the play’s opening demonstrates, “violence 
was one of the main props of patriarchy in early modern England,” but Titus’s resort to the 
murder of his own son in order to regulate a breach in social relations shows how “it was a 
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resource open to appropriation and abuse, and in its most extreme forms violence was deployed 
by men in ways which deliberately contravened prescriptive tenets of self-government” (Shepard 
128). He is neither a militant father nor a fatherly soldier; instead, he is a soldier who expects his 
children to show the same loyalty and devotion to him that he does to his emperor, as was 
modeled by the common hierarchy of God, King, Man. Saturninus, however, does not engage 
with the Andronici’s squabble and rejects them entirely: for who is Titus now a warrior? How is 
he to achieve honor if he has rejected his blood relatives and consequently lost the opportunity 
for kinship with the emperor? Lavinia’s silence in this scene emphasizes the violence, 
destruction, and death necessitated by conflicting patriarchal messages about honor and duty.  
Lavinia’s willful silence and opacity in the play’s earlier scenes draws attention to the 
danger of interpreting her as passive instead of as a survivor of a system that consistently 
neglects her agency. Bassianus’s repetition of Saturninus’s accusation of rape draws attention to 
the common feelings of all of the men onstage, but particularly Saturninus—the emperor—that 
they are victimized by the war over Lavinia’s body, establishing their tendency to appropriate 
her trauma and foreshadowing later events. Her kidnapping and the ensuing bloodshed reveal the 
ways in which it is not, in fact, Saturninus’s (as a symbol of the monarchy, of society) “rape” 
that the audience witnesses here, but Lavinia’s. Implicated in this system of honor and violence 
as well, Saturninus, despite the lack of evidence of her participation, still blames Lavinia for 
“[leaving] me like a churl” (1.1. 409 and 490). However, in light of the ambiguity of what little 
dialogue Lavinia has before her attack, it is crucial to entertain the possibility of Lavinia’s 
passivity as a deliberate silence on her part, necessary for her survival. Her response to 
Saturninus in Act 2, Scene 1 underscores this possibility: as Fawcett points out, to his lewd 
suggestion that she might be as tired after her wedding night as his new wife, Lavinia 
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enigmatically answers “I have been broad awake two hours and more” (2.1.18)—she does not 
say that she is tired, but she does not say that she is not tired either—which might be read as “a 
refusal of any kind of dramatic interchange, a deliberate muteness,” which Fawcett reads as “an 
abjuration of sexuality” (266-267).3 On the one hand, Fawcett’s reading makes sense; Lavinia 
would want to distance herself as far as possible from Tamora’s likeness as Romans would have 
seen her as an “alien [race],” which were ”defined precisely through their departure from 
normative gender behavior” (84). It is important to note, however, that the focus here is not on 
Tamora; Saturninus is merely using her as a prop to draw attention to the sexuality of the woman 
he lost. Consequently, as she is being gawked at by both the monarch and his subjects, Lavinia 
must respond “correctly” in order to uphold her virtue and honesty. Contradictory patriarchal 
standards of conduct, however, necessitate a response that could be interpreted as either a chaste 
wife’s refusal to share any information about her sexuality or a confirmation of their sexual 
activity—activity that is the fulfillment of wifely duty. As the head of state, Saturninus’s 
misogynist assumptions about women’s sexuality ensure that they are already always raped; 
therefore, we must pay careful attention to how Lavinia survives this constant reinscription of 
trauma on her body by the men that claim to care for her. If we observe only the ways that 
Lavinia is victimized and not the ways the play shows her survival, then we too will fall victim 
to the patriarchal mindset that there are no alternatives to the violence, destruction, and death the 
play seems to be critiquing.   
Lavinia’s literal rape, then, is only a natural conclusion for Aaron to draw after 
witnessing the patriarchal forces at work among the Romans, especially her treatment by 
 
3 Francesca T. Royster seems to agree in “White-limed Whites: Whiteness and Gothic 
Extremism in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus,” referring to Lavinia being “so moderate in her 
desires” (447).  
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Saturninus and Titus, against whom the Goths seek revenge; her rape is an act of war against 
Titus. Although Aaron initially tells Chiron and Demetrius that they “do but plot [their] deaths” 
(1.1.577) in bickering over who would be more likely to woo Lavinia, his mind is quickly 
changed when Demetrius reminds him that she is, after all, the emperor’s sister-in-law: so the 
brothers should “join for that you jar” and “resolve / That what you cannot as you would achieve, 
/ You must perforce accomplish as you may” (603, 605-607). He claims that “Lucrece was not 
more chaste / Than this Lavinia” who is a “dainty doe” for “a solemn hunting” (167, 609-611). 
He alludes to Lucrece’s rape, which Shakespeare describes as “the poor frighted deer, that stands 
at gaze, / Wildly determining which way to fly” (“The Rape of Lucrece” 1200-1201).  Like 
Tarquinius, Demetrius and Chiron will be the hunters and Lavinia the doe to be chased and 
violated like Lucrece. Aaron’s language here takes the language from the earlier exchange 
amongst the Romans to its logical extreme: Lavinia is not merely an object, but game hunted and 
consumed for sport. She is not merely something to be traded for social status, but also 
something less than human that is intended to satisfy man’s basest and most primal instincts. As 
Marguerite A. Tassi argues, “these violent actions serve as a perverted sacrifice that reciprocates 
the ‘irreligious’ sacrifice of Tamora’s son” (100). Good parenting under patriarchy, then, not 
only requires violence of adults but also teaches violence to children as a form of personal and 
political revenge.  
Additionally, Tamora’s complicity with the plot to rape and maim Lavinia establishes 
both how women can appropriate nationalist violence for their own benefit even as they find 
themselves victims of it, further perpetuating a deadly cycle. Lavinia is always an object to be 
used in battle between factions—she is always the daughter of Titus, a Roman warrior, the 
Goth’s conqueror, a connection to him that constantly denies her subjecthood, making her the 
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perfect mechanism for revenge; moreover, she openly mocks Tamora when she and Bassianus 
catch her alone with Aaron, comparing Saturninus to Actaeon and her company with Aaron to 
“sport” to humiliate her new husband (80).  She mocks Tamora for outlaw forms of sexuality 
both raced and adulterous—so her mockery is sexually charged and also defines Tamora as 
Saturninus’s property. Lavinia’s harassment is a sign of her own participation in the patriarchal 
erasure of women’s agency for her benefit. Lavinia’s connection to Titus as well as her use of 
Roman masculinist violence to humiliate Tamora makes Lavinia’s rape the ideal revenge.  
Tamora’s hesitation in following through, however, forces the audience to imagine how 
the plot’s trajectory may have been different if Tamora had rescinded her masculinist ethos of 
ownership of female bodies and violence and stopped her rape or mutilation. Although Tamora is 
initially receptive to Aaron’s plan for “Philomel [to] lose her tongue… / [and her] sons make 
pillage of her chastity” (2.2.42-43), she ultimately finds it difficult to see Lavinia merely as the 
“booty” of war (49). After all, Tamora knows better than any other character in the play that 
women’s bodies are all too often the collateral of war, as “we can see how white supremacy is 
normalized and patrolled through the bodies of women… through the failed project to 
incorporate Tamora into the Roman social body” (Royster 435). Tamora’s body, one that we are 
repeatedly reminded is Goth rather than Roman, is literally one of the spoils of Rome’s victory 
handed over to its emperor to use as he pleases. It would not be a stretch to assume that Tamora 
has experienced the violence of war herself, especially considering what surely must have 
occurred before the play begins, and she is made to beg for her son’s life and forced to marry one 
of her captors. These experiences might explain why, as Lavinia pleads with Tamora as one who 
“bearest a woman’s face” to “show a woman’s pity” and even using the same heart-wrenching 
“O’s” that Tamora spoke on behalf of her son, Tamora cannot stand to look at her or even hear 
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her cries and repeatedly demands her sons take their victim away, saying, “I will not hear her 
speak” and, twice, “away with her!” and  (2.2.135 and 157).  
Tamora’s call for revenge is a refraction of the masculinist violence perpetuated by the 
Romans, but her inability to do the job herself or see it through results in Lavinia’s survival. She 
tells Lavinia that her fate is less the consequence of her offensive words than it is of Titus’s 
murder of Albarus, instructing her sons “therefore away with her and use her as you will: / The 
worse to her, the better loved of me” (161-167). Her instructions reveal the extent of her grief for 
Alarbus and an objection to the way her son’s body was used for Titus’s ritual sacrifice. 
Referring to Lavinia’s rape and mutilation as “their fee” marks Tamora’s entrance into the same 
masculine discourse as the earlier scene by also reducing Lavinia to a commodity (both in her 
instruction and her language) to be destroyed and returned, an act to be performed against Titus, 
an act of war against him, indicating how she also sees Lavinia as an extension of her father. 
However, she does so in a way that distances herself from the act and the lustful violence that 
motivates it (179). The need to distance herself reveals how close in proximity she herself 
actually is to objecthood, causing Lavinia to again appeal to Tamora’s “womanhood” and its 
prescribed early modern characteristics: pity, grace, and charity—but Tamora’s rejection of these 
qualities ultimately causes Lavinia to see her as “The blot and enemy to [woman’s] general 
name” (182 and 183). Her accusation draws attention to Tamora’s appropriation of certain tenets 
of patriarchal manhood, but they are qualified by the obvious emotional tension between the two 
women. Tamora’s vague request that her sons “make her sure” results in Lavinia’s horrific and 
inexcusable rape and mutilation as well as what her uncle and father perceive as her shame, 
true—but ultimately, Tamora leaves her alive (187). This “branding or scarring [her] with [her] 
shame” (Catty 109) rather than death will allow Lavinia the possibility to finally be truly seen by 
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the men who claim to care about her and, eventually, to “play the scribe” (2.3.4) and take part in 
her own revenge. 
Marcus’s immediate response to Lavinia’s rape and mutilation reveals the central 
problem of the play: the opacity of her character due to what the men around her perceive to be 
the constraints of her raped and mutilated body. In his attempt to “read” her mutilated body, 
Marcus, while neglecting important questions, uses the language of male desire to make the 
audience see her—take in the violence she has experienced—as raped. When he initially 
encounters Lavinia, the language he uses to describe the severity of her wounds is grotesquely 
poetic: her hands are branches that have been “lopped and hewed” and her mouth is “a crimson 
river of warm blood, / Like to a bubbling fountain stirred with wind, / [rising and falling] 
between… rosèd lips” (2.3.17 and 22-24). One can only imagine how profuse Lavinia’s bleeding 
must be to be described “As from a conduit with three issuing spouts” (30). Lisa S. Starks-Estes 
uses Lynn Enterline’s argument that Marcus’ speech is, in fact, a blazon that anatomizes 
Lavinia’s dismembered body and “presents [it] as an erotic object of desire” (90)4. Even his 
description of her unimaginable trauma is laced with the same language used to both objectify 
women and commodify their beauty. He sees her body as ruined and calls attention to the 
violence used against that beauty. As Lavinia stands on stage, silently bleeding, Marcus’s speech 
forces the audience through the uncomfortable activity of both watching her suffering, 
unappeased, and seeing a perverted version of someone’s former love object, one that is even 
more perverted when seen through a male family member’s eyes—yet Lavinia actually stands 
onstage, is visible to the audience with or without his objectifying rhetoric. His words are 
 
4  For a discussion of Marcus’s use of the blazon, see Enterline, Lynn. The Rhetoric of the Body 





redundant because Lavinia is her own object lesson; he does not need to make the audience see 
her, to describe her features in such a gross way.  
Marcus’s reading of Lavinia marks the beginning of the dilemma that haunts the 
remainder of the play: Lavinia’s body can only “speak”—or rather, “be spoken”—through the 
interpretation of others as “Lavinia’s body, like Philomela’s tapestry, tells a story, one that is the 
focal point” (Starks-Estes 93), regardless of the fact that it is clearly visible to the audience. The 
“story” that Marcus “tells” by “reading” Lavinia’s body is one that emphasizes what he assumes 
to be her turning away in “shame” at his recounting of Philomela’s rape when in fact it could 
very well be the pain of reliving her trauma through Marcus’s crude narration (3.1.27). The 
audience is painfully aware of this possibility as Marcus continues using rape metaphors to refer 
to her as “the deer/ That hath received some unrecuring wound,” reminding the audience just 
how similar the Roman men’s view of women, even their own kin, are to game: to be hunted and 
killed (90-91). He places the audience in the uncomfortable position of deciding whether to 
accept it or to attempt to read her themselves. Even more discomfitingly than his objectifying 
rhetoric, Marcus has no idea how close he is to the truth when he recounts the very allusion that 
her violators used as inspiration for her attack, exclaiming “some Tereus hath deflowered thee / 
And, lest thou shouldst detect him, cut thy tongue” but “a craftier Tereus… hath cut those pretty 
fingers off / That could have sewed better than Philomel” “a tedious sampler… her mind” (2.3. 
26-27, 41-43, and 39). Marcus’s language, however, emphasizes just how distant from empathy 
and close to violence that interpretation can be. Moreover, although Marcus seems to sense his 
own inadequacy at interpreting Lavinia’s signs, wondering aloud “Shall I speak for thee? Shall I 
say ‘tis so? / O that I knew thy heart, and knew the beast,” his suggested solution to her awful 
trauma is, of course, entirely selfish and uninterested in any action whatsoever: “That I might rail 
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at him” (2.3.33-35). While his assumptions are correct, the tension created by his rhetorical 
questions implies that perhaps he might not be able to read her mind—that he is, in fact, 
incorrect about what happened to her. He does not, however, provide her any opportunity to 
show some sign of agreement or disagreement despite the fact that she is capable of 
communicating to a certain extent: despite her condition, she does open her mouth when he asks 
her why she does not answer him, and she does turn away as he anatomizes what he sees (and 
what he assumes) has happened to her body. The audience must make the uncomfortable choice 
to either accept Marcus’s reading or to attempt to read Lavinia themselves. 
Moreover, his solution to her trauma is entirely inadequate as he neither seeks to aid her, 
to comfort her, nor to seek justice. Instead, his solution is not only selfish, but it will also 
continue to reinscribe trauma: he wants to complain in order “to ease my mind” and for the 
family to “mourn with thee” after the sight of Lavinia inevitably “[makes] thy father blind” 
(2.3.35, 56, and 52). His language here is contradictory: if the family grieves with Lavinia, she is 
designated subjecthood, but if the mere sight of her blinds her father, she is no longer the acting 
agent and no longer someone who was violated—the violation shifts to Titus. This is doubly 
violent for if an object is named and then accepted as “disgusting,” which his words suggest, 
because of the emotional reaction it elicits in the subject, then Marcus’s assumption that 
Lavinia’s body will blind Titus further transforms her “into an object of disgust” (Panek 1). 
While Starks-Estes argues in favor of reading these lines as a “sadomasochistic fantasy of the 
mutilated or tortured body of the martyr on display” over David Willbern’s interpretation of the 
lines as “a description of Lavinia as a Medusa figure who suggests the fear of castration” (91)5, I 
argue that both readings are valid as they emphasize the men’s emotional experiences over 
 




Lavinia’s as well as the tension between the horror at and fascination with only her body. 
Marcus’s speech not only magnifies the horror of Lavinia’s rape and mutilation for the audience, 
but Marcus “rapes” her again by presenting her mutilated body to the audience as a grotesque 
spectacle.   
Titus’s reaction initially seems to be nearly the opposite, but is, in fact, even more self-
involved than Marcus’s: he makes her mutilation about him, even about his body. Even when 
confronted with the violence done to her, the pain she must surely be experiencing on multiple 
levels, Titus can only see Lavinia as an extension of himself. When Marcus tells Titus “This was 
thy daughter,” Titus responds that “she is” (3.1.63-64, italics my emphasis). He confirms that his 
daughter is, indeed, living. Moreover, when Lucius falls to his knees, crying out “this object kills 
me” (again my emphasis), Titus tells him to “arise and look upon her,” that which, as both her 
attackers and Marcus have already said, “was my deer” (65-66 and 91); he also later insists both 
men “look… look on her!” (111). On the one hand, he calls on the other men not to turn away 
from her body, to reinscribe the shame they assume she feels after such a horrific trauma. On the 
other hand, while Laura Mulvey is speaking of cinema when she argues that “the woman 
displayed [functions] on two levels: as erotic object for the characters within the screen story, 
and as erotic object for the spectator within the auditorium” (Mulvey 442), her argument easily 
transfers from the screen to the stage. The men display Lavinia to each other and the audience, 
and Titus’s response is to call upon them (and, in turn, the audience) to look not at her, but 
“upon” or “on” her, as if her body is something to be observed, to be consumed by the eyes—
repeating and reinscribing, with a larger audience now, the trauma Marcus enacted when he first 
came upon her. While Titus’s language might reflect the love of an early modern father for a 
daughter who has experienced violent trauma, while we might read him as compassionate and 
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even as forcing everyone to contend with the violence she has experienced, the play is careful to 
highlight how that love actually reinscribes objectification, forcing her to again become a “thing” 
and to relive her trauma. In a moment when the audience anticipates compassion and action on 
Lavinia’s behalf, they are met with the harrowing reality of the spectacle her uncle and father 
have made of her suffering and mutilation.   
Even worse, Titus only cares about and grieves for Lavinia as an extension of himself, 
which painfully reinscribes her trauma. Like Marcus, he can only understand her pain in relation 
to its impact on him. Titus’s self-obsession engenders sympathy for Lavinia’s suffering while 
simultaneously revealing how Titus plays an increasingly more obvious role in its causes. Even 
though he does not move to stop her wounds, Titus does inquire about her attackers. He does not, 
however, wait for a sign or an answer, instead immediately launching into a wildly self-involved 
monologue that essentially erases her trauma, her pain—which is still on full display for the 
audience as she waits while he raves:  
Give me a sword, I’ll chop off my hands too, 
For they have fought for Rome, and all in vain; 
And they have nursed this woe in feeding life; 
In bootless prayer have they been held up, 
And they have served me to effectless use.  
Now all the service I require of them 
Is that the one will help to cut the other. 
‘Tis well, Lavinia, that thou hast no hands, 
For hands to do Rome service is but vain. (3.1.71-81) 
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Any attempt at justice, at providing her agency, or even simply comfort, is overridden by his 
self-absorption. Initially, Titus seems to demonstrate some sympathy for his daughter in saying 
that he would cut off his own hands. He does not say this, however, as a sign of solidarity; 
instead, he uses her body as a lens to look more closely at his own. His hands are useless; they 
have failed him in gaining any favor or sympathy from Saturninus. The only function they now 
serve, he says, is for one to chop off the other—not to seek revenge on Lavinia’s attackers or 
even simply serve her, who has none. Furthermore, he tells Lavinia that she should not grieve for 
her lost hands, as their only purpose would have been to serve a thankless Rome. His self-
obsession is magnified to a grotesque extreme as he stands beside his mutilated and silent 
daughter, using his perfectly good tongue to word a lament for his two perfectly good hands. He 
reduces hands to use—failed use—effectively erasing Lavinia’s trauma, her pain, the violence 
done to her as moot. Moreover, he not only later repeats this gross claim to Marcus in order to 
elicit his sympathy, but also doesn’t stop at comparison; Titus laments, “he that wounded her / 
Hath hurt me more than had he killed me,”, and “that which gives my soul the greatest spurn” is 
not what happened to his daughter, but actually “is dear Lavinia” (92-93 and 102-103) herself; 
his grammar insists that her body itself is the insult—as opposed to what was done to it— 
reminding us of her value as discussed in Act 1, Scene 1. Lavinia is a constant reminder to Titus 
of his own failings. For the audience, his lamentations are a constant reminder of the daughter he 
has, so far, failed to truly “see.” Consequently, he robs her of any agency she may have 
otherwise had. Åström’s claim that “These scenes present Lavinia as an extension of her father’s 
body,” certainly holds true, but I would argue that his perception of her as an extension of 
himself causes us to become increasingly aware of and angry at his neglect of the daughter who 
is still bleeding, who is still suffering unimaginable pain directly in front of him (128). His 
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treatment of her reinforces the violence done to her, reiterates it, and reinscribes it on her… yet 
he only understands it as having had an impact on him.   
Similarly to Marcus’s rhetorical questions, Titus’s instruction for Lavinia to “make some 
sign how I may do thee ease” creates an opportunity for Lavinia to express herself and her needs, 
yet, like Marcus, he too early forecloses that possibility for her (3.1.122). Instead of giving her 
enough time to make some sign, he instead immediately launches into a long series of seemingly 
rhetorical questions that focus on his own grief and mock hers: 
Shall thy good uncle and thy brother Lucius 
And thou and I sit round some fountain, 
Looking all downwards to behold our cheeks, 
How they are stained like meadows yet not dry, 
With miry slime left on them by a flood? 
And in the fountain shall we gaze so long  
Till the fresh taste be taken from that clearness 
And made a brine pit with our bitter tears? 
Or shall we cut away our hands like thine? 
Or shall we bite our tongues and in dumb shows 
Pass the remainder of our hateful days? 
What shall we do? (123-134) 
There are no stage directions here to indicate how Lavinia behaves during this speech, and it is 
entirely possible that she, broken and bleeding, spends his entire monologue attempting to “make 
some sign” that Titus is clearly oblivious to as he, like Marcus, prioritizes the ways her attack 
impacts him instead. He does eventually come to the logical conclusion that “Let us that have 
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our tongues / Plot some device of further misery,” but he does so without considering his 
daughter’s ability to respond to real questions (134-135). This tension calls into question Titus’s 
claims to “understand her signs” (144). Does he? It is certainly possible, but it is also important 
to note that first, he has been away at war for the last 10 years, and second, as an early modern 
man who rigidly upholds patriarchal ideas, he sees his children only as extensions of himself 
rather than autonomous beings. Moreover, what need has the audience to trust his interpretations 
if they can see Lavinia’s actions themselves? The titillating tension between allowing and 
denying Lavinia agency continues when Lucius offers to wipe away Lavinia’s tears and Titus 
claims that “Had she a tongue to speak, now would she say / That to her brother which I said to 
thee”: to refuse the napkin and continue to grieve (145-146). Later, he suggests that because she 
cannot appropriately mourn without hands, she should either “wound [her heart] with sighing… 
kill it with groans, / Or get some little knife between thy teeth / And just against thy heart make 
thou a hole” (3.2.15-17); her primary function is to mourn for herself and her family to the point 
of self-destruction, as her life is, according to Titus, no longer worth living otherwise. Not only 
does he refuse her any agency, he does so under the guise of actually providing some meaning 
for her after her attack. To not know Lavinia’s mind but to know her body is a kind of rape by 
her family, and we are made painfully aware of the ways that Titus perpetuates this. 
The play demonstrates that we too can fall prey to our visceral reactions and foreclose 
opportunities for agency. For example, Titus seems to be aware of his own insufficiency when he 
insists “I will learn thy thought. / In thy dumb action will I be… perfect… / I of these will wrest 
an alphabet / And by still practice learn to know thy meaning,” which I suggest signifies what he 
knows to be a faulty interpretation of his daughter’s bodily signs (3.2.39-45). After all, she does 
attempt to provide him with some clarity: for example, when Titus allows Aaron to cut off his 
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hand in an attempt to save his two sons (which, by the way, Lavinia is present for and somehow 
entirely unnoticed during), Lavinia kneels with him in prayer, and after she kneels beside him, he 
exclaims, “What, wouldst thou kneel with me? / Do then, dear heart,” asking her a rhetorical 
question and then answering it himself with an imperative (210-211). He seems genuinely 
surprised at her ability to express her agreement, but encourages her to continue doing so. 
Moreover, when his prayers go unanswered—and his sons’ heads are returned to him—Titus 
casts aside his sorrow and calls for revenge, but chooses to include Lavinia as a participating 
member. Titus explains how Lavinia “shalt be employed” in this act of revenge against 
Saturninus and Tamora: rather than having Marcus, who has two working hands, carry both a 
head and Titus’s hand, he tells Lavinia to “Bear thou my hand… between thy teeth” (3.1.282-
283). On the one hand, as many critics have noted,6 this could mark Lavinia’s entrance into the 
play’s revenge plot. She may not have had the opportunity to communicate Tamora’s complicity 
in her attack, but she should certainly not hesitate to seek revenge for it. On the other hand, this 
command could be interpreted symbolically as no different than Chiron covering Lavinia’s 
mouth to prevent her from speaking before he and his brother drag her into the forest because 
beyond being wildly undignified in demonstrating that her best “employment” is to carry 
dismembered body parts, it is not a request and also inhibits her ability to “make signs,” 
effectively silencing her. While at the time, “the ornament of a woman” (Smith 12) was her 
silence, seeing Lavinia carry her father’s hand in her mouth reminds us, “censor the body and 
you censor breath and speech at the same time” (Cixous 350). The latter reading, however, in 
many ways “rapes” Lavinia all over again. To read Titus without considering these possibilities 
is not only to even further deprive Lavinia of agency, but also to take part in reinscribing trauma 
 
6 See, for example, articles cited by Deborah Willis, Marguerite A. Tassi, and Jennifer Panek.  
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on a victim who is continually being more grotesquely silenced by those who claim to care about 
her.  
However, the play goes on to demonstrate what is possible when we truly listen to 
Lavinia instead of silencing her. When Titus allows Lavinia enough agency to be heard, she 
communicates not only her attackers’ names, but also their crime, and her desire for a specific 
type of revenge, suggesting that they have not, so far, interpreted her correctly—or at least well 
enough. Act 3, Scene 2 features Lavinia taking part in a family banquet where her nephew 
requests Titus “make my aunt merry with some pleasing tale” (47). Later, when reading with her 
nephew, both Marcus and Titus remind the boy of how much his aunt loves and cares for him; 
the boy even goes so far as to respectfully volunteer to “most willingly attend your ladyship” 
(28). These two scenes, in particular, exhibit what Lavinia’s life might look like if the men 
around her, particularly her father, did not prevent her from actually living it. It is in this 
comfortable, comforting space that Lavinia “[seizes] the opportunity to speak… to write” 
(Cixous 351). Initially, the men are confounded by her movements; it is not until she physically 
“turns over the books” that they understand her intention: there is an answer within them 
(4.1.29). Titus, providing her with an opportunity to more effectively communicate, offers his 
entire library for the task. But the answer is already available in the text at hand, and he helps her 
turn the pages to find it. For the first time, he asks her a direct question: “Lavinia, wert thou thus 
surprised… / Ravished and wronged as Philomena was, / Forced in the ruthless, vast and gloomy 
woods?” to which she nods her assent (51-54). Like Tamora, Lavinia borrows a language she 
knows the men will most likely understand—but she borrows hers from the pages of the book; 
moreover, her choice of this particular tale, one previously referenced by Aaron and Marcus, is 
the borrowing of a specific story she knows they will recognize. Titus creating the space for her 
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to communicate allows her to reveal what happened to her the day of her attack. Moreover, 
instead of continuing a closed “yes or no” methodology of questioning, he asks her an open-
ended question she cannot possibly answer by simply gesturing: who did it? Marcus is the one 
who arrives at a solution that permits her the most agency: “He writes his name with his staff, 
and guides it with feet and mouth” (68). His gesture acknowledges the subjectivity of meaning-
making and does not lead to misinterpretation and misunderstanding; instead, he devises a means 
by which Lavinia can (as fully as possible) express herself.  
The play seems to suggest a particular ethics here: in order to fully accept the agency of 
those who are most marginalized, one must allow them to, as Cixous claims, “write their bodies 
into existence.” While Catty Jocelyn describes this model of female utterance by women like 
Philomela and Lucrece as a “swansong” (4-5), and Tassi claims that Lavinia’s speechlessness 
“signifies the unspeakable nature of her violation” (98), the combination of Lavinia’s word 
choice and the phallic image of the staff/pen suggests that providing agency for utterance may 
require a reimagining of what constitutes dignity. Providing conditions that enable the most 
agency may not fit neatly inside the parameters of what is considered “dignified” or “decent.” 
Both Jocelyn’s and Tassi’s interpretations highlight our limited abilities to communicate the 
impact of horror and violence. However, Lavinia’s guidance of the staff using her mouth and her 
arms transcends the boundaries of decency and allows her to communicate in a way best 
summarized by Cixous: “women must write through their bodies… submerge, cut through, get 
beyond the ultimate reserve-discourse, including the one that laughs at the very idea of 
pronouncing the world ‘silence,’ the one that, aiming for the impossible, stops short before the 
word ‘impossible’ and writes it as ‘the end’” (355).  
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Titus and Marcus actually do facilitate Lavinia’s speaking and model the effectiveness of 
such an ethics. While Lavinia discovers her ability to communicate her rape through the pages of 
a book, her family creates the opportunity for her to rewrite the revenge plot to include justice for 
crimes committed against her. Moreover, The Latin term she uses to describe the crime against 
her—stuprum—carries connotations of “pollution, so that the victim, however innocent of 
causing the act, was nevertheless irreparably tainted” (Moses 49). Lavinia feels shame and seeks 
revenge, which would make sense because her family habitually reminds her that she has been 
“ravished” and has yet to take any action on her behalf. She knows that “women’s bodies were 
both the cause and register of shame” (Gowing 232) and because her husband has been 
murdered, the shame of her rape falls on her father. Thus, “she writes a word that will activate a 
system of punishment performed by males” (Robertson) and “quite unlike Lucrece… can return 
her shame to her attackers by transforming them into something even more vile” (Panek 2). Her 
direct accusation here forces her family to both acknowledge the wrong done to her as a “chaste 
dishonoured dame” and to act, to “prosecute… mortal revenge” by killing Demetrius and Chiron 
and mutilating their bodies, desecrating them by feeding them to their mother (4.1.90 and 92). 
While this reinforces the idea that a violation of her body is an offense that is not personal to her 
but rather exclusively impacts the men in her family (as it would have been seen at the time), 
whose assistance she needs in order to achieve justice, it also shows how facilitating open-ended 
communication with Lavinia about her needs and desires enables her agency. We should, 
however, be less wary of Lavinia’s use of a patriarchal system in this moment (as it is the only 
thing that seems to spur revenge for her attack into action) than we should be of the men’s 
immediate usurpation of the conversation. She is told what to do (“kneel” and “come” [87 and 
120]), but never again provided an opportunity to express herself. This is not to suggest that 
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Lavinia is not an active and engaged participant in the revenge plot, but rather to expose the 
silencing of women. 
While Titus encourages Lavinia to witness and to participate in his revenge on her 
attackers, its impact is flattened by his objectification of her and his preoccupation with personal 
revenge that ultimately results in her death. When he binds and gags Chiron and Demetrius, he 
invites Lavinia to look on them, permitting her use of the gaze that is so often turned on her. The 
syntax of his address to the brothers, however, turns that gaze back on her. “Here stands the 
spring who you have stained with mud, / This goodly summer with your winter mixed,” Titus 
announces (5.2.169-170). The syntax of these two clauses calls for the brothers to look at 
Lavinia, to look at how they have marred the beautiful image of her body; the language Titus 
uses to describe their actions (of “mud” and “winter”), however, is still natural and thus 
diminishes the forced violence of the act. To use language associated with nature to describe the 
rape of mutilation of his daughter is again conforming to patriarchal—and therefore 
objectifying—norms. Moreover, it almost sanctions the attack as something natural itself, 
something the men may not have been able to control, like mud after the rain or winter ending a 
beautiful summer. Titus does Lavinia further violence when he claims that the brothers took “her 
spotless chastity,” implying that it is something that can be taken by force (and that she is, 
therefore, no longer chaste) (176). Because he believes her no longer chaste, Titus commands 
Lavinia to “come, / Receive the blood” in a basin held between her stumps, an incredibly 
sexually charged image (196-197). He reveals to the brothers that he, like Progne, will feed their 
bodies to their mother at a banquet “for worse than Philomel you used my daughter,” which is 
true: whereas Philomel was raped and her tongue was cut out by Tereus, Lavinia is raped by two 
men and has both her tongue cut out and her hands cut off—but Titus says that “worse than 
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Progne I will be revenged,” by which, as we are soon to find out, he means not only 
dismembering the brothers to bake into a pie to feed to their mother, but also publicly murdering 
his own daughter before murdering their mother as well (194-195). This moment shows that 
Titus can identify with a woman (Philomela’s sister), but that he seeks an even more drastic form 
of revenge than the already horrific plan of feeding Tamora’s sons to her. We do not yet know 
that this will include murdering his own daughter as well, but his words imply a need for even 
more destruction in order to reestablish his honor.   
 The manner in which Titus stages Lavinia’s murder suggests a preoccupation with his 
own honor that eclipses hers, and it also makes obvious the patriarchal economy of honor’s 
overreliance on death for its maintenance. He asks Saturninus, Rome’s patriarchal figurehead, a 
leading question: “Was it well done of rash Virginius / To slay his daughter with his own right 
hand / Because she was enforced, stained and deflowered?” (5.3.38). When Saturninus denies 
Virginius’s rashness and responds correctly, Titus “locates Lavinia’s survival in nonlinear time” 
(Schwarz 77) as she has already lost her chastity to rape, and he uses this as a “warrant” to kill 
her, proclaiming “Die, die, Lavinia, and thy shame with thee, / And with thy shame thy father’s 
sorrow die” (5.3.43 and 45-46). Titus’s use of this particular question to “sanction” Lavinia’s 
murder as well as his proclamation point to the ways that maintaining a sense of patriarchal 
manhood requires violence, even death. Imagine a Lavinia struggling, fighting for her life in the 
shock of this very last moment. If the Andronici’s revenge “returned” her shame to her attackers, 
then she would not have felt the shame that necessitated death. Even Tamora is horrified that 
Titus would “[slay] thine only daughter thus” (54). Moreover, Titus’s articulation of his need to 
end Lavinia’s life in order to end his own sorrows highlights just how dangerous patriarchal 
fatherhood is, and Tamora and Saturninus’s reaction, which is rightfully aghast at this “unnatural 
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and unkind” (47) deed, emphasizes the ways that “although violence was one of the most 
powerful patriarchal resources, it was impossible to control, both because it was so diffuse and 
because it served a range of male identities beyond the patriarchal agenda for order” (Shepard 
151). Titus insists on Lavinia’s death, and he is obsessed with ending her life because of the way 
that he believes her life hurts him. 
While it is entirely possible that this moment is one of mutual decision, what if it isn’t? 
Jennifer Panek argues that “it is only reasonable to think that [Lavinia] knows how [Philomela’s 
story] ends, and that’s exactly the revenge she’s demanding” (7), which implies revenge against 
the violators and, ultimately, freedom for the victim. Her story ends not only with Progne’s 
revenge of forced cannibalism, but also with the gods turning Philomela into a bird so that she 
can escape the wrath of her violator. Despite the fact that Lavinia is rather clear about her 
position in using Ovid’s text to convey the story of her attack, Titus immediately conflates 
Philomela’s story with Lucrece’s in his call for “Mortal revenge” (93) against the Goths. The 
myth’s revenge plot is not the only significant difference from the story of Philomela—so is 
what happens to the woman who has been the victim of the attack: Lucrece takes her own life. 
The “tarnished” woman’s suicide is commonly explained in conduct books of the time as the 
only logical option, as Juan Luis Vives explains using the story of Lucrece, who Demetrius and 
Chiron alluded to when devising Lavinia’s tragic fate: 
 What can be safe to a woman saith Lucrecia, whan her honeste is gone? And yet had  
she a chaste mynde in a corrupt body. Therefore as Quintilian saythe, she thrist a  
sworde in to her body, and avenged the compulsyon, theat the pure mynde might be  
seperated from the defyled body, as shortly as coude be. But I saye nat this bicause  
other shulde folowe the dede, but the mynde: Bicause she that hath ones lost her  
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honestie, shuld thynke there is nothynge lefte. (Vives 34)  
Vives suggests that even though a woman need not take her own life as a consequence of her 
rape, she should see herself as without value. While this value system does not directly 
encourage suicide, it reinforces patriarchal violence: first, by convincing women that they have 
lost their value if their honesty has been compromised, and second, by also giving the men who 
rely on that worth permission to assume those women have lost their value. This notion does not, 
however, suggest that these women’s lives are worthless, which is an important distinction. Its 
ambiguity leaves room for living, although finding meaning in such a life seems impossible 
when conduct authors compare it to suicide. If Titus views his daughter as more similar to 
Lucrece than to Philomela, whom she has self-identified, he does not view her life as valuable 
beyond using her for his own personal gain in a game of revenge.  
Lavinia’s brutal murder by Titus in the play’s final scene confirms that he no longer finds 
value in her life beyond using her as a player in his plot for revenge. It is necessary to consider, 
however, that Lavinia may believe there is something left beyond revenge other than suicide; the 
opacity of her character neither confirms nor denies such a possibility. When given the 
opportunity to truly live by her family, Lavinia eats meals with them, reads with her nephew, and 
finds new and increasingly more nuanced and effective ways to communicate with them, 
including calling for revenge on her attackers and taking part in the plot herself. Nothing Lavinia 
has done thus far suggests that she wants to end her life over her shame, and to do so would not 
have proven so difficult as to be impossible, including throwing herself off some parapet. Berit 
Åström, on the other hand, claims that Lavinia’s earlier plea to be murdered rather than be raped 
justifies her murder by Titus. To have been murdered instead of raped would have maintained 
her chastity, which would have revealed “the demand for figures that signify fixed sexual states” 
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requiring death (Schwarz 53), but this is no longer possible, so it cannot possibly justify her 
murder. This only emphasizes the entirely selfish nature of the act: Titus’s reputation (he 
believes) will survive precisely because Lavinia’s body does not, a value system which 
demonstrates the patriarchal prioritization of men's reputation over women’s lives. The four dead 
bodies on the stage testify to the failures of both the militant patriarchal government and the 
militant patriarchal father; both “use the dead to decide what lives are worth living, not to ‘them’ 
but to a consensually manufactured ‘us’” (Schwarz 58).  
Although the title suggests that this play is, quite simply, about the father, as Tassi points 
out, Lavinia has nearly as much stage time as Titus—so we must consider not only what kind of 
father he is (one who is preoccupied with “earning” the “honor” and “dignity” offered by an 
oppressive patriarchal economy, even at the cost of his innocent children’s lives), but also how 
his choices impact his daughter. By allowing the audience to watch Lavinia survive her trauma 
as Titus’s wars transition from national to factional to personal, even if only briefly, it quickly 
becomes clear that Titus’s treatment of his daughter not only reproduces, but also resists such a 
custom by suggesting the possibility of alternate ways of living after such a horrific trauma. 
Lavinia’s body, intensely magnified by her silence, becomes an inscrutable fulcrum for  her 
trauma, and the play’s ending only leaves us wondering whether or not her father interpreted it 
correctly. Rather than erasing Lavinia or her agency, her daily objectification, rape, and murder 
by her father instead makes her agency, her desire, and her suffering more painfully obvious to 
the audience. Maybe we too need to listen harder lest we silence her.  
 While the setting and structure of J. M. Coetzee’s postcolonial novel Disgrace initially 
seem uncannily similar to those of Titus Andronicus, a closer reading of Disgrace reveals a 
narrative arc in which a daughter creates the conditions of possibility for a father who does his 
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absolute best to be blind to them. Although historically inaccurate, Titus’s central conflict 
fictionalizes the ongoing disputes between the invading Romans and the conquered Goths, 
specifically those between Titus and Tamora. Separated by time, history, and geography, 
Disgrace fictionalizes the land disputes that dominate post-apartheid South African discourse as 
the nation grapples with the effects of colonial land ruling, both social and material. As Megan 
Cole Paustian argues, Disgrace “[speaks] to… the ‘problem-space’ of the post-apartheid present 
in which the troubling continuity of inequality, poverty, and violence, reveals the urgent need to 
reimagine the post-struggle horizon” (104). Disgrace, like Titus, calls for a reimagining of a 
world that is enmeshed in a vicious cycle of violence. Also like Titus, Disgrace is told from the 
perspective of the “victors,” the entitled and narcissistic white South African professor David 
Lurie and his daughter Lucy. Like Lavinia, Lucy is also the survivor of an act of war, a horrific 
act of sexual violence with an important variation: she is not physically mutilated to prevent her 
from identifying her attackers. Lucy, unlike Lavinia, chooses to be silent about her attack, while 
her father, like Titus, does his best to make her trauma about himself. Unlike Lavinia, Lucy 
repeatedly interrupts sanctioned meanings of daughterhood (and, eventually, motherhood) and 
sets the terms of her own agency, which David must accept if he wants to remain in her life in 
any meaningful capacity. Whereas Titus exposes the silencing of women, Disgrace calls for an 
ethics that decenters the white male experience and creates the conditions of possibility for a 
drastic reimagining of the future.     
Despite the fact that a Black woman is the very first to refuse and displace David’s logic 
of power, like Titus, Disgrace’s early chapters establish how thoroughly enmeshed in a stratified 
world view—in which he is at the top—he is. The book opens with David’s already well-
established working relationship with a sex worker named Soraya deteriorating to the point of 
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stalking her at her home. He refuses, however, to even acknowledge this as a violation, let alone 
apologize for or repent it; he assumes not only Soraya’s cooperation, but also her pleasure in 
interacting with him and is surprised when she rejects him. David’s assumptions about Black 
women are deeply engrained in what George Yancy refers to as “colonial gazing,” and the 
focalization of the text through David emphasizes the influence of the white European patriarchy 
on South African society, “where the colonizer (white, good, intelligent, ethical, beautiful, 
civilized) is superior in all things, while the native (dark, exotic, sexually uncontrollable, bad, 
stupid, ugly, savage, backward) is inferior” (4).7 His imperialist attitude is evident throughout 
David’s relationship with Soraya whose “honey-brown” and “exotic” features he finds alluring 
(Coetzee 1), but especially when she declines his business after he follows her on St. George’s 
Street while she is shopping with her children, who he begins to imagine himself as a “foster-
father, step-father, shadow-father” to. Previously, he saw himself as “uxorious,” a doting 
husband to a rather simple woman whose desires matched his, yet seeing her on the street with 
her family shatters that illusion, makes her into a whole person with desires separate from his 
own that he has no control over (2, 6, and 8). As a consequence of his growing anxiety about 
losing control, he hires a private detective to track her, and he is surprised when she asserts her 
agency and demands that he leave her alone. She rejects his paternalism by asserting that she is 
not, in fact, some subordinate “daughter” figure and redraws the power boundaries. In that 
moment, Coetzee presents the reader with a rhetorical question: “But then, what should a 
predator expect when he intrudes into the vixen’s nest, into the home of her cubs?” (10). It is not 
clear whether the question is David’s or the narrator’s, but what is indelibly clear is that David is 
a predator out to hunt. Whether that be merely an animal or a sexually promiscuous woman, both 
 
7 Similarly to the Romans’ views on the Goths in Titus Andronicus.  
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readings inexcusably dehumanize Soraya, whose backstory we cannot possibly know. By 
focusing on David, an unlikable, entitled middle-aged middle-class white man, the text demands 
the reader consider the violent and terrifying impact his attitude and actions have on her. His 
comfort depends on the destruction of her life outside of her job, the destruction of her reality in 
favor of David’s fantasy as he forces his own reading and interpretation onto her.  
Soraya’s rejection propels David toward targeting easier prey: one of his young 
undergraduate students, Melanie. Not only does David “other” Melanie’s quiet nature, referring 
to her as “the dark one” and renaming her Melanie-Meláni, he also fetishes her youth and abuses 
his role as her teacher, insisting that “a woman’s beauty does not belong to her alone…. She has 
a duty to share it” (18 and 16). Moreover, he interprets her passivity as flirtation and repeatedly 
codes her as “wanting it.” He reads her smile as “sly rather than shy” and then “evasive and 
perhaps even coquettish,” so that he distorts even the most innocent behavior (11-12). He even 
interprets their interaction as one that is sexually charged from its first moments. Yet her 
reactions to physical contact suggest that he has not merely misinterpreted opaque signs; David 
notes that “she is passive throughout… her eyes closed, her hands slack, a slight frown on her 
face” (19). Her absence from class the following day and her slip in grades, moreover, suggest 
that this has been a traumatic experience for her. Not only does he commit sexual violence 
against her, but he also misrepresents her by coding her as some kind of “temptress” figure. 
When Melanie pulls away from him, he stalks her at home, like he did with Soraya, and forces 
himself on her because, he claims, he simply cannot help but give himself over to the passion 
that such a beautiful young woman inspires. He rapes her (despite the fact that far too many 
critics hesitate to call it precisely that)8, but David and members of the committee of inquiry 
 
8 Elizabeth Anker refers to it as a seduction, Albert du Toit calls it an “affair,” Derek Attridge a 
“liaison,” while both Tom Herron and Maria Lopez refer to the relationship as merely “abuse.” 
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called to investigate the relationship view his actions as “not rape, not quite that” (Coetzee 25). 
The description of her reaction, however, leaves no doubt that this is, indeed, rape: it was “as 
though she had decided to… die within herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of the 
fox close on its neck” (25). The comparison of David to a predatory animal and Melanie to his 
prey, reminiscent of his invasion of Soraya’s home, again animalizes a woman (an age-old 
expression of racism, although Melanie’s race is ambiguous), comparing her to an innocent and 
vulnerable animal, and it also demands the reader consider the emotional impact such a violent 
and horrific act can have, forcing the victim to resort to the basic instincts of survival. David’s 
presumptions of women’s sexuality and of their consent to a sexual relationship with him based 
on race and now age disqualify him from the sympathy that he so desperately believes he 
deserves.  
The entrance of Melanie’s father realigns Melanie as someone’s daughter, and moreover, 
establishes a type of fathering that decenters itself and provides opportunities for accountability 
and repentance. Melanie’s father calls David and asks him to “talk some sense into her” as “she 
wants to give up her studies and get a job” (36); he doesn’t appear to know why she is so 
desperate to leave school, but apparently she has been speaking a great deal about David. A week 
later, Mr. Isaacs shows up at David’s office to confront him about what he’s done, calling him “a 
viper,” demanding his shame, yet also giving David the opportunity to explain “if [he’s] got hold 
of the wrong end of the stick” (38). Mr. Isaacs establishes an alternate type of fathering: one that 
clearly cares enough about his daughter to confront an individual that he believes is preying on 
her, yet one that does not seek revenge and instead, is willing to concede to the authority of the 
professor rather than unequivocally believing his daughter. He confronts David and accuses him 
of a crime, but still provides him with the opportunity to speak for himself, establishing a type of 
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fathering markedly different from David’s when he is later placed in a similar situation: one that 
decenters anger and blame and allows for other perspectives. While this may initially seem like 
an erasure of Melanie’s voice, ultimately her father does not hesitate to outright accuse David of 
violating his daughter, and even warns him that “you have not heard the last of it” (38). David, 
even as a father of a daughter himself, still refuses to admit his violation and flees, thus 
reinscribing both the trauma he himself has enacted on her as well as the trauma of her father 
being willing to hear David’s version of events.  
Even when David admits to the charge of “victimization or harassment of students by 
teachers” (39), he effectively silences Melanie again by refusing to read her formal statement—
refusing to hear her—and dismissing any call for sincere admission of wrongdoing as a form of 
unnecessary emasculation. As Lianne Barnard argues, “he should take into account her view of 
the matter, something he consistently refuses to do. Even at the risk of losing his job, he prefers 
his own view of the events to the exclusion of all others” (24). He silences Melanie not only by 
raping her, but also by refusing to read her testimony—an act of oppression Mr. Isaacs himself 
rejects—and one that significantly undercuts David’s outrage. He cannot read Melanie’s 
statement because it dishonors him, but he is not willing to admit wrongdoing. David’s 
interactions with Soraya, Melanie, and her father in the novel’s early chapters establish how 
controlling and destructive attitudes towards women and people of color uphold antiquated 
conceptions of honor and dignity (ones that will shape the way he reacts later to his own 
daughter’s attack); furthermore, although the committee for inquiry is hardly a model of 
accountability, David’s preoccupation with his own dignity and honor at the expense of all others 
ultimately does not allow him to maintain his esteemed position as an academic at the university. 
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When David decides to leave Cape Town to visit Lucy after feeling dishonored by the 
proceedings, he still cannot understand the events from any point of view other than his own 
even when Lucy challenges his narrative; instead, he turns her argument into a personal attack on 
her body. His anxiety, like Titus’s, is over “what he leaves behind,” which he tells Lucy stems 
from his belief that “by comparison with being a mother, being a father is a rather abstract 
business” (62-63). He refers to fatherhood using the remnants of the same imperialist attitudes 
displayed in Titus: it is a transaction in which he expects to gain something; moreover, his 
comparison of it to motherhood “[depends] upon an exclusive identification of woman with the 
reproductive or copulating body” (Spivak 355). While he initially decides, however, that “If this 
is to be what he leaves behind—this daughter, this woman—then he does not have to be 
ashamed,” he quickly changes his mind as the ways in which she exists cease to align with his 
idea of “a higher life,” perhaps because he cannot think of her as more than merely a body (62 
and 74). First, he hopes that her life in the countryside “is only a phase,” clearly undermining the 
life she has built for herself (64); next, he decides that his initial use of the word “ample” to 
describe his daughter’s body is too “kind,” and that “soon she will be positively heavy. Letting 
herself go,” a reactionary contrast to the content of their conversation: it is David, in fact, who is 
“letting himself go” as he is “so perfect that [he] can’t do with a little counselling” and “would 
prefer simply to be put against a wall and shot.” Rather than acknowledging the validity of her 
points, he turns her criticisms of his behavior into criticisms of her body and her lifestyle. 
Moreover, Like Titus, he seems to prefer death to change, or as Lucy calls his attitude: 
“unbending.” Unlike Titus, however, we are privy not only to his words, but also to David’s 
innermost thoughts. After he tells Lucy that “they wanted a spectacle,” he does not add “The 
truth is, they wanted me castrated” (65-66). Perhaps both men prefer marginalization to 
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castration, which is somehow worse—in Lacanian terms, the loss of the privilege of the phallus. 
To accept a woman’s agency, even to empower it, is a threat to both of these fathers—and why 
wouldn’t it be, considering how patriarchal power seems only to result in violence and death? 
Castration, however, “cannot be feared if the phallus were not already detachable, already 
elsewhere, already dispossessed… Significant in its misogyny, this construction [of the 
feminine] suggests that ‘having the phallus’ is much more destructive as a feminine operation 
than a masculine one, a claim that symptomatizes the displacement of phallic destructiveness and 
implies that there is no other way for women to assume the phallus except in its most killing 
modalities” (Butler 65-66). David seems to be aware of the masculine relationship between 
dignity, which inevitably comes at the expense of others less privileged than him, and death—
and either does not care or fears what would happen if he were to take responsibility for and 
repent his actions publicly. Admitting his wrongdoing to his daughter, to the committee, to 
Melanie or her father, to Soraya—for David, would be terrifyingly emasculating, destructive of 
the power hierarchy he is a direct beneficiary of. This anxiety has left him with few options, and 
he rejects the possibility of living a life in which he feels “castrated” by admitting not that he 
raped a student, but only that he “victimized” or “harassed” her in some way.  
Whereas Lavinia’s concession to the prescribed feminine role initially assures Titus of his 
social elevation, Lucy’s rejection of conventional womanhood and daughterhood convinces 
David that somehow his daughter will “save” him and lead him to a higher life—yet he somehow 
manages to come to this conclusion while completely ignoring her criticism of his behavior. 
Lucy rejects a multitude of sanctioned ways of life for the daughter of a university professor: not 
only did she move to the country, she also operates a farm where she grows flowers and boards 
dogs, and it is implied that she may be a lesbian. Moreover, she does not hold back her opinions 
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and constantly reminds David of the fact that he is an active patriarchal agent, especially in his 
“relationship” with Melanie. She “[presumes] to tell him about women,” which he can hardly 
believe, and when he attempts to argue that “Every woman I have been close to has taught me 
something about myself. To that extent they have made me a better person,” Lucy responds with 
the declarative “I hope you are not claiming the reverse as well. That knowing you has turned 
your women into better people” (69-70). It is clear that Lucy makes a valid point as David is 
silent, unable to come up with a reply. We only know of a few relationships David has had with 
women, all failures: two divorces, his solicitation and stalking of Soraya, his rape of Melanie, a 
brief affair with an office secretary, his affair with Bev Shaw, and the solicitation another young 
sex worker, all of whom he thinks himself superior to. We might assume that these failures are 
largely due to David’s narcissistic attitude, his conviction that he (and only he) has something to 
gain from these relationships. Lucy falls silent, but it is not because David has made the better 
point; instead, he has managed to miss her argument entirely—for an ethics of responsibility that 
is tied to privilege—altogether. She “draws a break [and] seems about to respond to his homily, 
but then does not;” the implication is not that she cannot think of a response, but rather that she 
senses its futility in responding to his “holier than thou” premise and chooses not to. When 
David agrees that “we are all souls. We are souls before we are born,” Lucy points out that 
regardless of his professed belief in equality, he lives on his “own terms.” His reaction to her is 
hardly a concession: “Forgive me, Lucy,” he says, “For being one of the two mortals assigned to 
usher you into the world and for not turning out to be a better guide” (79). He does not apologize 
for the fact that his behavior demonstrates a firm belief in inequality or that he has done any 
wrong. He apologizes for not being a better father. Moreover, he deflects blame, saying he was 
only half of a pair and that he only happened to not “turn out” to be “better.” The condescension 
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of his response implies that he believes that his efforts were more than enough, and that 
somehow she should accept what he perceives to be merely imperfections. Significantly, Lucy 
doesn’t accept his apology or offer forgiveness; instead, she asks him to prove his beliefs, which 
he reluctantly accepts. She refuses to allow him to re-enter her life unchanged, and the narrative 
emphasis belies the wisdom of her demand: he no longer sees himself as her “guide.” Instead, he 
firmly believes that as a father, it “is his fate [to turn] more and more… toward his daughter. She 
becomes his second salvation… Poor Lucy! Poor daughters! What a destiny, what a burden to 
bear!” (86-87). Like Titus, he has expectations for the role he believes his daughter is obligated 
to fulfill, and those expectations extend to his perceived function of all daughters’ obligations to 
their fathers, to “bear the burden” of “saving” them. Despite critical concern about the impact of 
the focalization of David’s perspective, this conversation lays bare the disparity between his 
perceptions and reality. His view of the world depends on control and limitation of women solely 
for men’s benefit; according to David’s worldview, even when women like Lucy have agency 
and autonomy, it is only for the purpose of becoming their father’s caretakers.    
Even though he has done very little to prove that he respects her autonomy, when Lucy is 
brutally attacked, David cannot accept that his daughter does not seek her father’s help. But what 
happens when a father can no longer rely on his daughter for his salvation, as Titus cannot once 
Lavinia is raped and mutilated by Chiron and Demetrius? Or, as David frames it, “How will they 
stand up to the testing, he and his heart?” (94) as Lucy is raped by three men. Not only are 
David’s initial assumptions about the role an adult daughter should play shattered, so are his 
assumptions about his role as a father to a violated daughter. Like Lavinia, Lucy is violated 
“offstage” by the perpetrators, their actions too awful to depict; however, while Chiron and 
Demetrius murder Bassianus, the three men leave David alive but injured while they attack Lucy. 
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Like Titus, David imagines that even when he is met with silence, his role as father guarantees 
his ability to “hear” his daughter: “Though he strains to hear, he can make out no sound from the 
house. Yet if his child were calling, however mutely, surely he would hear!” (94). Moreover, 
both fathers imagine that they can not only hear, but also interpret the needs of their daughters, 
despite the fact that both have proven themselves to be nothing short of selfish and completely 
oblivious to experiences outside of their own. Throughout the ordeal, he does not once actually 
hear Lucy cry out for him—although he repeatedly calls out for her, again and again. To imagine 
that she does is to imagine that she is a daughter in need of a father, but if she does not cry out 
for him, where does that leave him as a father? When she finally unlocks the bathroom door 
where David is trapped, she “has turned her back on him.” When he follows her and tries to 
embrace her, “gently, decisively, she wriggles loose.” Despite his inclination that his daughter 
has been raped, his first instinct is to touch her, which she clearly does not want. When he 
follows her to the bathroom, she tells him “don’t come in” and answers his “stupid questions”—
“Are you alright? Are you hurt?”—with silence. She rejects his attempts to prove himself her 
caretaker, a loving paternal figure. Not only does she refuse to be the victimized daughter in need 
of protection at this moment, but she also refuses to treat David as if he is a victim either: “She 
does not stir a finger to soothe him” and “leaves him” to get help. Moreover, before she leaves, 
Lucy asks that he “[keep] to your own story, what happened to you… You tell what happened to 
you, I tell what happened to me” (97-98). He fails to realize that she does not want or need him 
at this moment, and that his efforts to help are actively thwarting her ability to process her attack.  
Her request that he not tell her side of the story suggests that she understands how men—
especially fathers—will control the narrative at the expense of their daughters, as we saw in 
Titus. Her conversations with him prior to the attack only reinforce the idea that Lucy 
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understands quite clearly her father’s biases, and so by remaining silent, she chooses not to allow 
him to tell her story or to (mis)interpret it. He resists her choice, calling it “a mistake” and trying 
to take her in his arms again even when she clearly does not want to be, “still as a pole, yielding 
nothing” (99). He does not “hear” what her silence is saying to him: he is not what she wants or 
needs at this moment. In fact, he continually tries to touch her, even though her body language 
clearly reveals how traumatic his touch is to her. Although her silence is chosen, unlike 
Lavinia’s, the opacity of her silence implies the ways that manhood, including fatherhood, 
perpetuates and is complicit in violence. 
Like Titus, the turning point for David occurs as he struggles to balance respecting his 
daughter’s silence with his intense desire to protect her: he allows her to tell her version of her 
story. However, unlike Titus, David attempts to tend to Lucy’s private emotional needs by 
creating the conditions for her to process her attack safely and comfortably even though his 
motives are misguided. Even though it is clear that he cannot adequately care for himself, let 
alone Lucy, David is not willing to give up his paternal role, “to abandon his daughter,” despite 
the fact that his daughter clearly turns away from him in this moment (141). While he trembles at 
the hospital, Lucy seems to be “all strength, all purposefulness,” but her friend Bill Shaw is the 
one who picks up David when he is discharged, and Lucy is already asleep at their home 
“[having] taken a sedative” (101-102). David allows her to take charge of the situation and care 
for him despite the implication that this was an incredibly traumatic experience for Lucy. It 
bothers him, however, that “she has spoken to him as if to a child—a child or an old man” 
throughout this ordeal, highlighting a moment where the novel’s focus provides us with insight 
to David’s anxiety about aging, which he sees as emasculating, despite his prior eagerness for a 
daughter to be the agent of his salvation. This inherent contradiction demonstrates how 
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patriarchal notions of what it means to be a daughter set impossible standards: you are 
responsible for your father’s care, but don’t make him feel as if that’s the case. This anxiety is 
emphasized when he has a dream that Lucy calls out to him for help, and he slips into her room 
to “[watch] over his little girl, guarding her from harm, warding off the bad spirits” (103-104). 
He feels the most paternal instinct in a moment that is purely imagined, but it is perhaps the most 
sympathetic David has been yet. He wants to tend to Lucy’s immediate physical and emotional 
needs before seeking “justice” (very much unlike Titus), and although he struggles with precisely 
how to do so, he is trying. He repeatedly asks about her health, “leaves it to Lucy to take [the 
police] through the story she has elected to tell,” moves into her bedroom to “[chase the ghosts] 
out, not [allow them] to take it over as their sanctum,” and helps Petrus run her stall at the market 
when she asks (108-111). His actions exhibit his desire to protect her, to provide a space where 
she feels safe and secure enough to make her own choices unimpeded and unthreatened.  
He is not perfect, however, and cannot place what is in Lucy’s best interests ahead of his: 
he confronts Pollux, and later confronts Petrus about Pollux despite Lucy’s insistence that he not. 
She insists that she is “not her father’s little girl, not any longer” (105), and David needs to 
understand this if he wants to maintain any kind of relationship with her. He knows “Patiently, 
silently, Lucy must work her own way back from the darkness to the light. Until she is herself 
again” (107), and he does his best to create a situation for her to comfortably do so even while he 
struggles to understand her choices. Unlike Lavinia, Lucy chooses her silence, and because of 
the ambiguity of silence, it is perhaps easier for the reader, like David, to sit with its discomfort 
and allow Lucy to tell her story the way she wants it to be heard. In both trying to shield her from 
further injury and in respecting her desire to maintain some semblance of her life prior to the 
attack, David tries to create the conditions for healing despite not understanding her reasoning.  
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This is not to suggest, however, that David’s desire for Lucy to speak out against her 
rapists is not misguided. After the police report is filed, David asks her why she refuses to “[tell] 
the whole story.” He thinks to himself that “It will dawn on [the perpetrators] that over the body 
of the woman silence is being drawn like a blanket,” which, in his mind, is “[conceding] them [a] 
victory” (110). Critics like Lucy Graham agree with David, but actually the assumption that 
“silence is being drawn” is what reinscribes violence on Lucy’s body as it deprives her of any 
agency in how her narrative is told—or not told; that it is “conceding them a victory” is doubly a 
violence as it presumes what Lucy should or should not do as a result of what happened to her. 
On the one hand, silence once equaled death; now, silence also equals complicity, which is not 
much better. David’s desire for her to speak, however misguided, is rooted in the idea that to 
remain silent is to reinscribe violence on her body—an unexpectedly feminist line of thought. 
When he confronts her about this, however, he reveals the mechanics of a logic that, on the other 
hand, ultimately still reduces her to an object: “There is no shame in being the object of a crime. 
You did not choose to be the object.” He consigns her to objecthood despite the fact that the 
crime has already occurred and now she is an acting agent who is capable of making her own 
choices about how to move forward. Lucy does not dignify him with an answer—perhaps 
suggesting that in not reporting her crime, she rejects the notion of being an object at all.  She is 
not interested in what Graham calls “conscious restoration of the body as a site of suffering and 
violation” (440); this would be relegating herself to objecthood, which David fails to understand. 
When Lucy attempts to explain her reasoning, David’s inability to separate his 
understanding of justice from abstract principles like vengeance, guilt, and salvation forces her to 
end the conversation and refuse to have it until he makes an effort to understand her perspective.  
Her response to David’s misogynist presumption that she is “trying to remind [him]... of what 
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women undergo at the hands of men” is that what has happened to her is not about him or even 
all men. She rejects the notion that, as Jacqueline Rose points out, “under apartheid… there is 
very little women were guilty of” (180)9. Even so, her rape is not a public matter either; “It is my 
business, mine alone,” private especially, she claims, because she is South African. Lucy implies 
that she understands that she is a beneficiary of a colonial system, that gender is racialized in 
South Africa. She seems to understand the tension inherent in being both the beneficiary of a 
colonial system and the victim of racially motivated crime. When David presumes she means 
“some form of private salvation” or “[expiating] the crimes of the past by suffering in the 
present,” she must again redirect him (Coetzee 111-112). Her refusal to report what happened to 
her is not because of some “abstraction;” she sees the necessity of considering her role in 
apartheid South Africa not as some “white savior,” but as an individual who can “commit 
[herself] to the reconciliation process” (Rose 189). Lucy’s forced ending to this conversation 
emphasizes two important points: first, that she absolutely refuses and displaces his logic of 
power—what he later refers to as “stubborn, and immersed, too, in the life she has chosen” 
(Coetzee 134); and second, that if he wants to have a conversation with her, he needs to “make 
an effort to see that [she doesn’t act in terms of abstractions]” (112). She will not speak to him 
until he does. While, like David, we may be well intentioned in our desire for Lucy to speak up 
for herself, Coetzee continually emphasizes the fact that it is indeed Lucy’s choice not to, that 
she will not be pushed, and—most importantly—that she has a reason she needs us to try to 
understand.  
 
9 Jacqueline Rose is referring to the fact that women were not generally recognized as violent 
agents of the apartheid regime—at least until a woman came forward in the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission hearings to call attention to the violence and immorality of the 
passive acceptance of Apartheid.  
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David must turn to Lucy’s friend Bev Shaw for understanding; although he is still, 
without a doubt, too self-centered to get out of his own way, it is the first time he even entertains 
the possibility that his own point of view might somehow be limited . David cannot grasp the 
concept that some of these paths might be beyond his understanding. Bev reminds David “you 
weren’t there… You weren’t” (Coetzee 140). David’s response echoes Cixous’s claim about 
“masculine anxiety and its obsession with how to dominate the way things work—knowing ‘how 
it works’ in order to ‘make it work’” (887). He thinks to himself,  
Where, according to Bev Shaw, according to Lucy, was he not? In the room where the  
intruders were committing their outrages? Do they think he does not know what rape is?  
Do they think he has not suffered with his daughter? What more could he have  
witnessed than he is capable of imagining? Or do they think that, where rape is  
concerned, no man can be where the woman is? Whatever the answer, he is outraged,  
outraged at being treated like an outsider. (140-141) 
David’s incredulity is almost comical. His thoughts, words, and actions speak to a desire for 
control that is not dissimilar to Titus’s in usurping Lavinia’s trauma as fodder for his own 
personal revenge. Despite the fact of never having been the victim of rape (and setting aside the 
fact that he also does not view himself as the rapist that he is), he equates basic understanding 
with experience, completely overlooking and therefore eliminating the possibility of empathizing 
with his daughter. He cannot stand the idea of being an outsider, of not being able to understand, 
because he wants to be able to provide a solution that “makes sense” to him. While this is rooted 
in the desire “not… to abandon his daughter,” it is neither acknowledging his inability to 
sympathize with a woman’s experience of rape, nor permitting her the space to grapple with 
trauma that is uniquely her own  (141). He is so preoccupied with his own involvement in her 
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healing process that he completely neglects the possibility that he may not even fully understand 
what needs to be healed. As Phillip Dickinson explains, “What Bev and Lucy deny is Lurie’s 
epistemological recuperation of rape, his articulation of a universe to which he has full access. 
They resist his attempt to reproduce the world in a way that preserves, and even fortifies, his own 
subjectivity—to produce a seamless narrative in which Lucy is ‘a minor character who doesn’t 
make an appearance until halfway through’” (189). Despite the fact that he acknowledges that 
“he can, if he concentrates, if he loses himself, be there, be the men, inhabit them, fill them with 
the ghost of himself” (160), this conversation with Bev reveals the possibilities that exist outside 
of David’s worldview to the reader, establishing the effectiveness of an ethics that completely 
decenters the male experience—one that David has not yet accepted, even though he wonders 
whether or not “he [has] it in him to [imagine being] the woman?” (160). Ironically, he 
acknowledges that he can imagine being the perpetrator of such an awful crime, but he cannot 
endure the idea that he does not understand what it is like to be the victim. He cannot turn object 
into subject; this is the first time he even considers the limitations of his own knowledge.  
When Lucy demands that David accept his own complicity in the same gendered system 
that brought about his daughter’s attack, he pivots to an oversimplified understanding of race to 
thwart her efforts to make him understand her trauma. Even when Lucy compares her attack to 
murder—“When you have sex with someone strange—when you trap her, hold her down, get her 
under you, put all your weight on her—isn’t it a bit like killing? Pushing the knife in; exiting 
afterwards, leaving the body behind covered in blood—doesn’t it feel like murder, like getting 
away with murder?”—David can neither deny it nor explore that line of thinking (as he so 
proudly claimed the ability to do earlier). Instead of evaluating his own complicity in women’s 
subjection, he wonders if he and Lucy are even “on the same side” and brings up the race of her 
Walsh 48 
 
assailants in an effort to deflect (158-159). As David and Lucy both know (and as Sharon 
Friedman points out), women have always been the collateral of war, “subjects of harassment 
and rape… or forced impregnation…. Women are often targeted… to shame, intimidate, and 
unsettle communities” (596), and Lucy seems to be no exception. Moreover, although exact rates 
of sexual violence in South Africa are unknown, Romi Sigsworth of the Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconcilation notes that statistics from reported violence demonstrate “that 
someone is raped or indecently assaulted every minute in South Africa” (8). The problem, 
however, lies in how those statistics are portrayed: as Carine M. Mardorossian points out, “rapes 
of white women by black men… garner a disproportionate amount of media attention, even 
though nine out of the ten women who are raped in the country are black” (75).  
This context lays bare the danger in placing too much emphasis on Lucy’s attackers while 
the text provides us with little to no information about them, instead focusing on Lucy and how 
she copes with the attack. My argument here is not that the race of her assailants is not relevant, 
but that to focus on the race of her assailants as opposed to how a racially charged rape impacts 
its victim is (a) to take a clear stance along racial lines that feeds dangerously into the Black peril 
myth, and (b) to reduce Lucy’s choices to white guilt, to make her into some kind of symbol for 
post-apartheid society when in fact Disgrace “highlights the inextricable relationship between 
incommensurable categories of identity such as gender, class, or ethnicity in the application of 
legal and moral authority” (Mardorossian 8). The Black peril myth is a function of pervasive 
racist ideology that Black men are sexual predators who indiscriminately prey on white women. 
This is a violence that David seems to accept as legitimate despite the fact that he cannot answer 
Lucy’s accusation about his own role in sexual violence because he wants to think of himself as 
somehow “on” his daughter’s “side” rather than a perpetrator himself. To the second point, I can 
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only partially agree with Mardorossian’s reading that “Lucy accepts her fate as a symbol of the 
redistribution of power in postapartheid South Africa and sees her rapists as gathering apartheid 
debts” (74); although the attack may have been symbolic, for Lucy to consider that reality is not 
even remotely close to the same as accepting it as such; her later choices, in fact, prove the exact 
opposite. Instead, Lucy exhibits a working knowledge of the conditions of her attack, the 
potential impact of reporting it, and her ability to remove herself from such a narrative. While it 
is tempting to sympathize with David’s point of view that she needs to report the crime, his 
inclination to believe that it was both an individually motivated act of violence or that “history 
[was] speaking through [the rapists].... A history of wrong” requires acknowledgement of his 
own complicity in such a system, which he has already clearly refused. He is trying to do what 
he imagines to be “right,” but his reasoning is reductive rather than restorative.  
Lucy rejects his interpretations of her rape by appropriating not only overly simplistic 
patriarchal language, but also the medium David believes himself the expert in: writing. She 
leaves him a letter that says, “You have not been listening to me. I am not the person you know. I 
am a dead person and I do not know yet what will bring me back to life” (Coetzee 156 and 161). 
She is not grappling with guilt nor is she preoccupied with notions of “honor” that would force 
her to flee after losing it, like he did (160). David’s attempts to convince Lucy to leave the farm 
are an attempt to salvage what is left of a person that Lucy claims is dead—there is nothing left 
to salvage, only the possibility of reviving her dead self. What this reveals is how such violence 
can destroy, even kill, the self—but that there might be a way back to life. The way back will 
require imagining a future that, at the moment, seems impossible. What she sees as her revival is, 
for David, the “wrong road.” This exchange reveals David to be more similar to Titus than ever: 
although both fathers seek understanding from their daughters through direct dialogue (think of 
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Lavinia and her staff), both are obsessed with making meaning out of what is left of their 
daughter’s lives, of using them symbolically to salvage “honor” or to create a space where one is 
able “to live with [oneself]” (Coetzee 160). She sets her terms: David cannot hold onto both his 
concepts of dignity and honor and his relationship with his daughter. 
David wants to prove that he is right, to write his story as one of redemption, but his 
painfully obvious inability to decenter his own ego ensures his continued failure. When he 
decides to return to Cape Town, he stops at the home of Melanie Isaacs to speak to her father, 
from whom he asks forgiveness. Although Isaacs does not reject him entirely, he doesn’t grant 
him forgiveness. In fact, he redirects David by asking, “who did you really come to speak to?” 
David, not knowing what else to do, prostrates himself in front of Mrs. Isaacs and Melanie’s 
younger sister, much to their horror, and even then he feels “the current of desire” for the sister 
(173). The sincerity, the humility asked of him in the book's earliest chapters, still eludes him. 
This moment is not one of repentance and redemption; it is awkward because he is still missing 
the point: he has not apologized to his victim, and he still feels grossly attracted to a child. It is 
painfully obvious how little he has learned. Moreover, when David returns to his home, it has 
been ransacked and destroyed. At his office, he has been forgotten. On campus, he watches 
Melanie perform in a play, nearly losing himself in the excitement of seeing her again—until 
four spitballs and a flurry of hissing from her boyfriend bring him back to “the shocks of 
existence.” He even spends the night with a streetwalker “younger even than Melanie” (194) 
wondering what will become of his future. He he not learned at all; he is not sorry for anything 
that he has done, only that he has been caught. As Paustian posits, “living beyond apartheid 
demands more than an affective reordering of things through cathartic interactions, which enable 
apartheid’s beneficiaries to get off without… paying for it” (110). David’s choices are an attempt 
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at catharsis, at feeling as if he is moving forward with dignity. He offers empty apologies to 
everyone but his victims, expects to return to an arena of respect and dignity without having 
done any of the work for it, feels grossly “protective” (Coetzee 194) of a streetwalker he solicits 
services from. Each of these assumptions highlights how David’s solution to disgrace—
leaving—simply does not work, a realization that Lucy has already come to: “All I know is that I 
cannot go away” (161). He cannot avoid “paying for it” and expect redemption. Even though he 
may feel slightly better for having done something, he hasn’t changed anything for himself or for 
his victims. So what, then, we must ask, is the alternative? 
Lucy provides him with the opportunity to start again by taking on a drastically different 
role in her life as a grandfather, but he is not willing to give up his role as her father or to accept 
her rejection of sanctioned forms of motherhood. Lucy’s pregnancy represents her father’s worst 
fear: for his daughter to be “marked” by her attackers not merely by physical violence, but 
through reproductive violence; consequently, David struggles to accept her choice to keep the 
pregnancy. On the one hand, a child is a living reminder of the trauma of rape; David pelts her 
with questions when she announces her pregnancy in an effort to once again guide her to making 
what he believes to be the “right” decision: to abort it (Coetzee 162). His motivations for 
abortion only accentuate pregnancy’s symbolic power: 
They were not raping, they were mating. … And now, lo and behold, the child! Already 
he is calling it the child when it is no more than a worm in his daughter’s womb. What 
kind of child can seed like that give life to, seed driven into the woman not in love but in 
hatred, mixed chaotically, meant to soil her, to mark her, like a dog’s urine? (199) 
David’s language here plays on what he perceives to be the irony of his daughter’s decision to 
maintain the pregnancy and raise the child. He sees the child’s blood as polluted because of the 
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violent manner by which it was conceived. He conceives of the child as intentional, as the result 
of “mating” that was “meant to soil her, to mark her.” He still conceptualizes her as a victim, the 
object of a crime, and the child as a sign of that trauma. On the other hand, a child is the marker 
of a person’s entrance into a dramatically different role in life: parenthood, which places one in 
the acting role of caretaker. Before Lucy tells David that she is pregnant with her rapist’s child, 
she warns him “I cannot be a child forever. You cannot be a father forever. I know you mean 
well, but you are not the guide I need, not at this time” (Coetzee 161). David continues to 
struggle to accept this, as he “can’t imagine, in this life, not being Lucy’s father.” David is 
initially not ready to give up his role as father and become a grandfather. He cannot accept that, 
as Lucy tells him, “I have a life of my own, just as important to me as yours is to you, and in my 
life I am the one who makes the decisions,” yet he does concede linguistically to the language of 
“the child” (198). His language reflects acceptance of Lucy’s decision, yet he must let go of 
sanctioned views of kinship in order to be a part of their lives. David’s constant struggle with 
Lucy’s choices shows just how much choice she actually has: all of it because it is her body and 
no one else’s, and David must accept those in order to maintain a relationship with her.  
Moreover, like Lavinia, Lucy is both targeted because of her body and uses it as leverage 
to protect herself, but in a very different way. In Cixous’s terms, we might see her as having, 
“constituted herself necessarily as that ‘person’ capable of losing a part of herself without losing 
her integrity” (888). This feminine logic, the logic of not losing oneself to another (a baby), does 
not compute for David until Lucy explains it: “I will [love]. Love will grow… I am determined 
to be a good mother, David. A good mother and a good person. You should try to be a good 
person too” (Coetzee 216). Her pregnancy is not the end for Lucy, nor does she view it as a loss. 
Alternately, she views it as a gain, as a way to not only be good to her child, but to others—and 
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she suggests that David follows suit. This is the first time she outright acknowledges that he is 
not a good person, but she does so in a way that is open, that encourages him to become better. 
We know he respects her decision because he refers to himself as “a grandfather” and sees a 
future for Lucy and the child, “solid in [their] existence, more solid than he had ever been” (217). 
This is a space that Titus never even imagined for Lavinia, whom he viewed as ruined beyond 
repair. This ending is uneasy, however, as part of Lucy’s choice that David must accept includes 
marrying Petrus—who already has two wives (certainly a relationship that is far from normative 
to white Westerners)—in order to secure not only her personal safety, but also the home she 
intends to live and raise this child in. As Paustian points out, Lucy “senses that her land is being 
reclaimed through bodily seizure, and thus she extracts her body from the equation by releasing 
her claim upon the land. Giving up territory is a way of disarticulating her body from it,” and yet 
no longer owning the land does not mean that she will no longer live on it and benefit from it in 
some way (113). Although Petrus, a Black man, will gain the benefits of land ownership and a 
new wife, Lucy too will gain the security of the home she wants to raise her child in. To simplify 
this decision to “white guilt” is to negate the action Lucy takes not only towards decentering her 
trauma, but also towards a liveable future—one that requires negotiation with others. This 
decision is reminiscent of the concept of ubuntu, a term made famous by South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission that essentially means that “a human being is realized through 
his or her being (human) through human beings” (Rose 194). Lucy must acknowledge her role as 
a beneficiary of colonialism as a landowner, the way her Black neighbors have been negatively 
impacted by this, and how negotiating the terms of her presence on that land will open the door 
for a life there with her child. Moreover, not only does she redraw kinship lines in a way that will 
allow her to safely be a good mother to her child, but she does so in a way that will also force 
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David to contend with the racism that he has been so oblivious to from the novel’s first chapter. 
He will have a mixed race grandchild, a Black son-in-law, and his daughter will be related to one 
of her rapists by marriage. If he wants to be a part of Lucy’s life, he will have to accept the terms 
by which she will continue to live it. 
What David sees as a loss, Lucy sees as an opportunity for a new beginning. She and 
David both agree that “it is humiliating,” but Lucy adds that “perhaps that is a good point to start 
from again… To start at ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing” (205). 
To avoid humiliation, Lucy would still have to address a long history of violence and to lose 
something: her privacy, her land ownership, her home and her life in the country, the child, and 
perhaps some aspect of her emotional/physical well-being (she does say that she cannot go 
through with an abortion again). Her “nothing” in this context, is as Gayatri Spivak argues,  
the casting aside of the affective value-system attached to reproductive  
heteronormativity as it is accepted as the currency to measure human dignity. I do not  
think this is an acceptance of rape, but a refusal to be raped, by instrumentalizing  
reproduction. Coetzee's Lucy is made to make clear that the "nothing" is not to be itself  
measured as the absence of "everything" by the old epistemic-affective value form—the  
system of knowing-loving. It is not "nothing but," Lucy insists. It is an originary  
"nothing," a scary beginning. (21)  
Abortion and/or relocating would allow Lucy to start over “with nothing but” her dignity. What 
if she sacrifices her dignity instead? Lucy seems to understand that restoration, or what Paustian 
refers to as “social transformation,” is “messy, painful, and unsettling” (110). Rather than 
terminating the pregnancy, she chooses to end “life as she knows it” in order to harbor a new 
experience of it. David, also learning to live without the dignity he had imagined for himself, 
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acquiesces to the idea that “there may be things to learn,” to “a new footing, a new start” 
(Coetzee 218). Most importantly, his new start includes staying with Lucy and being involved in 
her life, even if he is not completely comfortable with it. He must decenter himself, take his cues 
from her. Like David, we may not agree with Lucy’s choices, but we do have to accept them, 
which then forces us to be open to the alternate possibilities—and alternate ways of finding 
integrity—available in her future. 
While Åström argues that “Narratives that depict female suffering, but which direct the 
audience to focus on male emotions rather than female bodies, invite the audience to distance 
itself from the suffering” (127), I would argue that the attention paid to male emotions in Titus 
Andronicus and Disgrace actually creates such an intense discomfort with Lavinia and Lucy’s 
suffering that it forces the reader to consider the possibility of living with it and beyond it in a 
myriad of ways. Moreover, it also makes the fathers’ centering extremely distasteful, something 
ugly to be rejected. The brutal rape and mutilation of his only daughter does not decenter Titus 
Andronicus’s obsession with honor, who lives and dies a vengeful warrior, a natural extension of 
the patriarchal order. When David Lurie’s daughter endures a similarly brutal attack, however, 
her refusal to acquiesce to him creates the conditions for David to ultimately be open to an 
uncertain future in a way that Titus is not for Lavinia. David’s eventual, even though reluctant, 
acceptance of Lucy’s choices and openness to learning in comparison to Titus’s staunch denial of 
Lavinia’s agency demonstrates how the patriarchal preoccupation with “dignity” and “honor” 
precludes various alternate possibilities for living, no matter how troublesome we may find them. 
Both works force the reader to consider what it looks like to live a life that is so radically 
emotionally and physically altered that there is no way to retain dignity without significant loss. 
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While Titus completely forecloses the possibility of life after, Disgrace makes it uncomfortably, 
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